These actions took place near the end of the First World War in Palestine. This was the same time as 'Lawrence of Arabia' and Col. Lawrence is mentioned when they met him a week after the main action I have included here. The whole task force was the 10th Cavalry Brigade of the EEF (Egyptian Expeditionary Force) which consisted of the Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers of the Indian Army, Berks battery of Royal Horse Artillery and others. General Allenby had planned a fast moving action north from the Jordan Valley to Damascus and then Beirut against the Turkish forces. On Sept 19th the 2nd Lancers had reached the Musmus pass and taken it quickly capturing 100 Turks around a fire, who they took for the advanced guard of a force moving south to hold the pass.

The maps here are photos of the hand-drawn maps in the account.

At 5am on 20th the orders for the second Lancers were

" The regiment will advance and take EL AFULE "C" squadron will move along the direct LEJUN-AFULE road and attack from the front. "A" squadron will cover the left flank and moving N. of the Marsh will attack from the north making the station their objective. "B" squadron will cover the right flank and attack from the south making the aerodrome their objective. "

Daylight was coming on; Mount Tabor stood up clear and bold against the dawn. To the left of it could be see the hills about Nazareth. The plain of ESDRAGON or ARMGEDDON was half hidden as was Afule by the low-lying morning mists. The direction of Afule was determined by compass bearing, but away to the right could be discerned the village of TEL ED DHAHEB perched on a low knoll.

ACTION AT MEGIDDO (ARMAGEDDON)

Report by Captain Davison, 2nd Lancers.

(Capt. Davison was awarded the D.S.O for this action).

"As the Squadrons moved off a steady fire broke out from the direction of point 193 at 05:30. Leaving Capt. Vaughan to bring along the reserve I rode forward to find out what was happening, and on approaching point 193 I received verbal message from the O.C. "C" squadron to the effect that he was held up by a force estimated at 80 rifles.,

I found the situation to be as follows :-

(a)
          The Turks were holding a position in the open about 1/2 mile east of point 193

(b)
           "C" squadron had dismounted 1 troop under R.M. Mukand Singh, and their Hotchkiss Troop, and were engaging the enemy with fire at about 800 yds. range, while the remainder of the squadron was concentrating in rear with a view to moving round the enemy's flank.

(c)
          The 11th L.A.M Battery were in action about 300 yards in front of "C" squadron and were engaging the enemy with Machine gun fire.

"From the high ground about point 193, the enemy position could be seen, and was fairly well demarcated by the dust raised by his rifle and M.G. fire, and I realised that the estimate of 80 rifles was much below the mark.

The soil was black cotton but in this particular place, was not so bad to stop horses galloping. The enemy's flank could be distinguished and, as there seemed to be no obstacles to hold us up, I decided to turn his left flank and gallop the position.

"I accordingly directed the O.C. "D" Squadron, (Capt. Vaughan) to Left Shoulder, pointed out the enemy's position and ordered him to go slow for 5 minutes to enable me to get the machine gun into action, and then turn the enemy's flank and charge."

"I then ordered the O.C. MG's to come into action from the neighbourhood of point 193."

"In the meantime I had dispatched the Adjutant (Capt. Ranking) to get in touch with the O.C. "A" squadron who at this time was on the road about halfway between MEJJUN and EL KHUZMER, and order him to work round the enemy's right flank. Owing to the distance that this message had to go and to the fact that "A" squadron was rather scattered when the order was received, the fight was over before the order could be acted upon.

By the time I had got to the M.G's into action I could see the "D" squadron was well round the enemy's flank in column of troops and almost immediately they wheeled head-left, formed squadron and charged in open order rolling up the Turkish front line capturing or killing every man.

R.M. Mukand Singh on seeing "D squadron charge mounted his troop of "C" squadron and charged from the front with good results.

in the meantime the O.C. "B" squadron seeing what was happening decided to cooperate with "D" Squadron on his own initiative.

My original intention had been to leave "B" squadron out to watch the right flank but the necessary orders did not arrive in time, so seeing what had happened I sent a message to JOMADAR Sarjit Singh who was commanding the troop of "B" squadron, sent to seize Trill ed Dhahee to remain out as flank guard.

As things turned out it was just as well that O.C "B" squadron acted as he did for the Turks were found to be holding the position in two lines, one immediately behind the other and some 300 yards apart and had "D" squadron been alone they might well have suffered heavy casualties from the fire of the second line.

The O.C "B" squadron realising this swung round outside "D" squadron and charged the Turkish support line rolling it up.

During the advance "B" squadron ran into a wire fence and became considerably disorganized while under heavy fire from rifles and M.G's. Ressaidar Jang Bahadur Singh however rallied his men with great coolness and reformed the squadron in time to cooperate with "D" squadron.

For his coolness and ability on this occasion Ressaidar Jang Bahadur Singh was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

The Turkish force was found to consist of a Battalion with 3 M.G's. Of those between 40 and 50 were killed and the remainder taken prisoner. None got away. The prisoners were numbered 470.

Our casualties in this action were one man wounded, and about a dozen horses which has to be destroyed.

For his skillful leading of his squadron on this occasion Capt. Vaughan was subsequently awarded the Military cross.

Comments by Capt. Davison

The reasons why an immediate attack was made on the Turkish position without waiting for anymore extensive reconnaissance than was possible from a general survey from point 193 was that :

This battalion was evidently moving up to hold the Musmus pass.

Their advance guard had been captured in its entirety two hours previously.

As far as I (Capt. Davison) knew no one had got away to give information of our approach and the chances were that the first intimation the Turkish commander had of our arrival was when our leading patrols were seen approaching.

The Turks therefore to take up their positions where they stood and could not select their own ground. Hence an immediate attack was indicated before they had chance to better their position and before the surprise occasioned by our approach had time to wear off.

The great value of our surprise and mobility and the moral effect of the lance were clearly exemplified in this action.

The battalion was fresh one and not been shaken by previous defeat, they fought well and kept up their fire until we got right into them: but the moral effect of the lance combined with the surprise and the unnerving effect of an attack from the front and flank caused them to throw down their arms as soon as we got in.

Their shooting may not have possibly been up to the standard of continental armies but this alone can hardly be held to account for the successful carrying out, with practically no casualties of an operation which has hitherto been set down as impossible, namely the charging by cavalry of unbroken infantry armed with modern rifles and machine guns. Its complete success must be largely attributed to the moral effect of a quickly moving force attacking from the flank with the "arme blanco".

The O.C "B" squadron acted rightly in cooperating his own initiative in the attack.

This squadron had been detailed as right flank guard and had received framed to achieve a certain object, vis. the captured of Afule. While engaged in carrying out these orders it was confronted with a new contingency to meet which no orders had been issued.

Events moved so quickly that new orders had not time to reach the squadron commander, but he could see what was taking place and cooperated on his own initiative.

The LAM battery afforded very great assistance both during the advance through the Musmus pass when they went on in advance of the regiment and reconnoitered the road and during the action itself. In the former their presence was found to add considerably to the confidence of the advance guard and the steady flow of negative information they maintained was most comforting.

In the later the cars moved dowm to within 500 yds of the Turkish position and maintained steady MG fire on the Turkish left flank. They ceased fire just at the right moment, as "D" squadron charged home and it was undoubtedly due to their effective support that our casualties were so negligible.